Volume 93
Issue 3 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 93,
1988-1989
3-1-1989

The Regulatory Flexibility Act: Orienting Federal Regulation to
Small Business
Doris S. Freedman
Barney Singer
Frank S. Swain

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Doris S. Freedman, Barney Singer & Frank S. Swain, The Regulatory Flexibility Act: Orienting Federal
Regulation to Small Business, 93 DICK. L. REV. 439 (1989).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol93/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

ARTICLES I

The Regulatory Flexibility Act: Orienting
Federal Regulation to Small Business
Doris S. Freedman*t
Barney Singer**t
Frank S. Swain***t
Table of Contents
I. Introduction ....................................
II. The Regulatory Flexibility Act ...................
A . P urpose ...................................
B. Coverage ..................................
C. Agency Analysis of Proposed Rules ...........
1. Certification ...........................
2. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis .....
3. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis ......
D. How the Act is Working ....................
1. General Implementation .................
2. Congressional Oversight .................
III. Judicial R eview .................................
A. History of Enactment .......................

440
442
442
444
445
445
446
447
448
448
451
455
455

* Director, Office of interagency Affairs, Office of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S.
Small Business Administration; B.S. 1966, University of Pittsburgh; J.D. 1971, Georgetown
University Law Center.
** Assistant Chief Counsel for Labor Policy, Office of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy,
U.S. Small Business Administration; B.S. 1983, Cornell University; J.D. 1986, Case Western
Reserve University School of Law.
*** Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration; B.A. 1972, Colgate University; J.D. 1975, Georgetown University Law Center.
t The views expressed in this article are those of the authors.

93
B.
C.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SPRING

1989

Judicial Review Provisions ..................
Court Consideration ........................

IV . C onclusion .....................................

457
459

463

I. Introduction
The Regulatory Flexibility Act' (hereinafter RFA or the Act) is
based on the premise that small entities2 may be forced to bear an
unnecessary and disproportionate burden when the federal government imposes regulations. When Congress debated the Act in the
late 1970's,' many small business owners testified about the difficulties they experienced in trying to comply with complex and expansive federal regulations." In order to mitigate this problem while still
1. Pub. L. No. 96-354, 5 U.S.C. §§ 601-12 (1981).
2. Under § 601(6) of the Act, the "small entities" intended to benefit from the Act are
"small organizations," defined to include any nonprofit enterprise which is independently
owned and operated and is not dominant in its field (RFA § 601(4)); "small governmental
jurisdictions," defined to include governments of cities, counties, towns, townships, villages,
school districts, or special districts with a population of less than 50,000 (RFA § 601(5)); and
"small businesses," which are the same as "small business concerns" as defined in Section 3 of
the Small Business Act which is codified at 15 U.S.C. § 632 (RFA § 601(3)).
3. See generally Regulatory Flexibility Act, S. 1974, Part 1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1977); Regulatory Flexibility Act: S. 1974, Part 2: Joint Hearings Before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Practiceand Procedureof the Senate Judiciary Comm. and
the Senate Select Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); H.R. 7739 and
H.R. 10632, Small Business Impact Bill, Part 1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Special
Small Business Problems of the House Small Business Comm., 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978);
H.R. 7739 and H.R. 10632, Small Business Impact Bill, Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems of the House Small Business Comm., 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); Impact of Federal Regulation on Small Business: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems of the House Small Business Comm., 96th
Cong., Ist Sess. (1979); Regulatory Reform, Part 3: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1979); Regulatory Reform, Part 4: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979) Regulatory
Reform Act of 1979, Part 1: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law and
Governmental Relations of the House Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Regulatory Reform Act of 1979, Part 2: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Administrative Law
and Governmental Relations of the House Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., 1st and 2d Sess.
(1979 and 1980).
4. By 1980, the cost of doing business had increased dramatically as a result of the
97
explosion of federal regulation during the 1 0s and the concomitant compliance costs. The
legislative and executive branches recognized the tremendous burdens imposed by the complexity of federal regulatons. One response was the Regulatory Flexibility Act. Another legislative response was the enactment of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (PRA), which took
effect on April I, 1981. 44 U.S.C. § 3501 et seq. (1982). The PRA was designed to reduce
both the amount of paperwork that business would be required to generate and to limit recordkeeping requirements. The PRA targeted several classes of the public for relief, small business
in particular.
Another regulatory action taken nearly simultaneously was the enactment of Executive
Order 12,291 (E.O. 12291). 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). Like the RFA and the PRA, it addresses the
burdens of federal regulation. Issued February 17, 1981, E.O. 12291 carried forward earlier
requirements that agencies engage in regulatory analyses for their rulemaking efforts, and
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maintaining the substantive intent of underlying statutes, Congress
enacted the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Act has a simple purpose: it requires that agencies analyze proposed rules in order to 1)
estimate their impact on small entities and, 2) lessen the burdens
posed by such federal rulemaking.
The RFA's goal, to place the burden of performing regulatory
analyses on federal agencies and to obtain input from those small
entities which will be regulated, is reflected in each of its sections.
The RFA also builds upon established principles of administrative
law. The Administrative Procedure Act 5 (APA), since its passage in
1946, has required that agencies notify the public of proposed rules
and accept and consider comments filed in response to their proposals. Congress has since recognized that more particular rulemaking
requirements are necessary, primarily because the task of providing
technical analysis of proposed rules to the agencies is simply too
great for small entities. The RFA is designed to place the initial
burden of analysis on the agencies. All of the extensive regulatory
analyses that the APA, the RFA, the Paperwork Reduction Act of
1980 (PRA), and Executive Order 122918 require lie firmly within
the purview of the regulating agency. Agencies have the most information about their proposals, know the intricacies of the statutes to
be implemented, and have a responsibility to know the basic characteristics of the regulated entities. Although the RFA does not exempt small entities from the responsibility to participate in the
rulemaking process (for example, small entities can provide anecdotal information on the specific character of their industries), federal
agencies must supply the analytic background upon which the public
can base its comments. Agencies should use the information thus
provided to develop a regulatory scheme with which small entities
can comply.
explicitly required that the benefits of a proposed rule must exceed its costs and that the most
cost-effective alternative be adopted. E.O. 12291 §§ 2(b), 3(d). See also supra note 3.
5. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1976).
6. ExEc. ORDER No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1982). The Executive Order was issued to
reduce the burdens of existing and future regulations, increase agency accountability for regulatory actions, provide for presidential oversight of the regulatory process, minimize duplication and conflict of regulations and insure well-reasoned regulations. The Order requires each
agency, in connection with every major rule, to prepare a Regulatory Impact Analysis which
describes the potential benefits of the rule, the potential costs of the rule, and a description of
alternative approaches to achieve the goal at lower cost. A major rule is one that is likely to
result in an annual effect of $100 million or more; a major increase in costs or prices for
consumers, individual industries, federal, state, or local government agencies, or geographic
regions; or significant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity,
innovation, or the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based
enterprise or export markets.
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While the goal of the RFA is theoretically sound, the legislation
falls far short in its enforcement. Unlike the APA, which is ultimately enforceable through the federal court system, and the PRA,
which gives the President a form of "veto" authority over paperwork
requirements deemed unduly burdensome and lacking in practical
utility, the RFA depends on voluntary compliance.7 By requiring an
annual report in RFA compliance from the Small Business Administration,8 the legislation bows in the direction of Congressional oversight; however, the most important enforcement mechanism - judicial review of agency RFA compliance - is precluded by the statute
itself. 9
This article will describe the way the Act does work and should
work, why meaningful judicial review is lacking, and in what ways
this lack of judicial review has minimized the overall effectiveness of

the Act.
II.

The Regulatory Flexibility Act

A.

Purpose

Under the RFA each federal agency must review its regulations
to ensure that, while implementing laws as intended, such regulations do not inhibit the ability of small entities to invent, to produce
or to compete.1 0 The major goals of the Act are: first, to increase
federal agency awareness and understanding of the impact of regulations on small entities by requiring agencies to identify and explain
those impacts; second, to require agencies to communicate and explain their findings to the public, including notification beyond the
traditional notice requirement of the APA; third, to analyze alternatives available to small entities in order to minimize impact on those
7. See Regulatory Reform Initiatives: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong. 2d Sess. 60 (1988) [hereinafter Regulatory Reform Initiatives]
(testimony of Frank S. Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business
Administration).
8. 5 U.S.C. § 612 provides:
The Chief Counsel for Advocacy of the Small Business Administration shall
monitor agency compliance with the chapter and shall report at least annually
thereon to the President and to the Committees on the Judiciary of the Senate
and House of Representatives, the select Committee on Small Business of the
Senate and the Committee on Small Business of the House of Representatives.
9. See 5 U.S.C. § 611. A discussion of the few courts having considered this issue is
found below at notes 77-99 and accompanying text. Some courts have reviewed regulatory
flexibility analyses as part of rulemaking records in review under the APA, as Congress originally intended.
10. U.S. Small Business Admin., Office of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy, The Regulatory Flexibility Act (1982) [hereinafter The Regulatory Flexibility Act].
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entities; and finally, to provide regulatory relief for small entities.1 1

Requiring agencies to identify, account for and publicize the sometimes hidden and often significant cost consequences of a proposed
regulatory action should clarify available regulatory choices and
avoid unnecessary alternatives. Agencies must balance the burdens
and benefits imposed by regulations and propose alternative regula-

tions which do not create unnecessary economic disparities between
entities of different sizes. 2 These alternatives may take the form of
separate compliance or reporting requirements, or of timetables or

exemptions which take into account the limited resources available
to small entities. The result may be regulation based on "tiering" -

imposing different requirements for entities of different sizes -

or a

decision to forgo regulation of smaller entities entirely."

The need for the statute is based on the perception that the
costs of regulatory compliance are primarily constant, fixed, and
largely unaffected by variation in the size of the entities which must
comply. 4 In many cases, however, the size of the business, government unit or nonprofit organization being regulated has a bearing on

the ability of that entity to comply with federal regulation. For example, the costs of complying with a particular regulation -

mea-

sured in staff time, direct compliance costs, recordkeeping, outside
expertise and other costs -

might be roughly the same for a com-

pany with sales of $10 million as for a company with sales of $1
million. In a larger business, the costs of compliance can be spread
over a larger volume of production. For small entities, a burdensome
regulation could affect the ability to set competitive prices, to devise
11. See 5 U.S.C. § 601 (note: Congressional Findings and Declaration of Purpose)
(1981).
12. See The Regulatory FlexibilityAct, supra note 10.
13. See letter from Congressman Marty Russo, Chrm. Subcomm. on Special Small Business Problems, to Congressman Neal Smith, Chrm., House Small Business Comm. (July 12,
1979):
The bill suggests a number of approaches to flexible regulations including
the use of "two tiered" or "multi tiered" standards for organizations and businesses of differing economic sizes, the use of performance-oriented [sic] standards rather than standards that impose particular technologies, and the use of
exemptions where imposition and enforcement on a rule on small concerns would
yield little benefit in terms of achieving the goals and purposes of the rule.
See also U.S. REGULATORY COUNCIL, TIERING: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE USE OF TIERING
As A REGULATORY ALTERNATIVE (1981). Another alternative is the reduction of burdens for
both small and large entities affected by a particular proposed rule.
14. "Most of this impact is unintentional in that the regulations typically do not distinguish among companies of different sizes. But in practice, forcing a very small firm to fill out
the same specialized forms as a large company with high trained technical staffs at its disposal
places a significantly greater burden on this smaller enterprise." Weidenbaum, cited in Regulation: Process and Politics, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., at 28 (1982) (Study prepared
for the Joint Economic Subcomm. on Growth and Stabilization, released April 8, 1978).
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innovations or even to make a profit. 15 In some cases, a small business may be unable to afford the cost of a regulation and stay in

business.
The RFA seeks to change fundamentally the method of regulating small entities. 6 The statute works in conjunction with the Ad-

ministrative Procedure Act

-

the basic process by which most regu-

latory policy is established - by requiring agencies to follow certain
procedural steps in the rulemaking process."i
B.

Coverage

The Act applies to every federal rule for which notice and comment is required by Section 553(b) of the Administrative Procedure
15. The existence of economies of scale in regulatory compliance indicates that the uniform application of government regulations places a disproportionate burden on small firms.
The analysis of data in one study of fourteen regulations affecting large and small firms in
approximately 150 three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) Code industries showed
that economies of scale existed in regulatory compliance for each of the industry-regulation
pairs. The scale economies arose from many opportunities to reduce average total compliance
cost as scale increased. See FAUCETT, ECONOMIES OF SCALE IN REGULATORY COMPLIANCE:
EVIDENCE OF THE DIFFERENTIAL IMPACTS OF REGULATION BY FIRM SIzE (1984).

16. The Regulatory Flexibility Act, supra note 10.
17. The RFA addresses certain other aspects of rulemaking which are not specifically
relevant to the analysis requirement or enforcement mechanisms, thereby falling outside the
scope of this article.
The procedural steps are described as follows:
§ 602. Regulatory Agenda
The RFA requires that federal agencies publish a regulatory agenda in April and October
of each year listing all rules which are expected to be published as notices of proposed
rulemaking in the Federal Register during the coming year. Rules to be included in the
agenda are those which are likely to have a "significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities."
To emphasize the importance of the agenda process, Section 602(c) requires the agency to
take active steps to notify small entities and their representatives directly or through trade
press.
The RFA requires that the agenda contain a brief description of the subject, a summary
of the rule and the name and telephone number of the knowledgeable agency official. In addition, the agenda must include a statement of the objective and the legal basis for the rule and
a schedule for completing action on the rule. With access to this information early in the
rulemaking process, small businesses have time to prepare meaningful comments.
§ 609. Procedure for Gathering Comments
The RFA expands upon the APA concept of notice only as publication in the Federal
Register and encourages agencies to use additional outreach techniques, such as the inclusion
in an advance notice of proposed rulemaking that small entities may be affected, publication of
the general notice of proposed rulemaking in publications likely to be obtained by small entities, direct notification of small entities, the conduct of open conferences and public meetings,
and the adoption of simplified procedural rules to reduce cost or complexity to small entities
wishing to participate in rulemaking.
§ 610. Periodic Review of Rules
The RFA requires agencies to publish a plan for the periodic review of existing rules
within six months of the effective date of the Act. The review of existing rules is to be completed within ten years of the effective date of the Act.

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT

Act (APA) or any other law.1 ' The APA does contain some exemptions, the most notable of which is for interpretative rules. 9 Interpretative rules are those which are intended only to implement a
statute and in which Congress has not delegated legislative-type authority to the agency.2 0 One rationale for exempting interpretative
rules from "notice and comment" rulemaking is that the agency is
only following the specifics of the legislation and has little or no discretion to change the rules." Nevertheless, agencies often have considerable discretion in promulgating interpretative rules or in classifying rules as interpretative.
C.

Agency Analysis of Proposed Rules

. Depending on a proposed rule's expected impact, agencies are
required by the RFA to prepare one or more of three documents: (1)
a certification; (2) an initial regulatory flexibility analysis; and (3) a
final regulatory flexibility analysis. These three items are discussed
below.
1. Certification.-If an agency proposing a regulation finds
that the proposal will have neither a significant beneficial effect nor
an adverse effect on many small entities, the agency may certify that
the rule does not exert a "significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities." 2 2 This certification must be published
with the proposed rule in the Federal Register and forwarded to the
Small Business Administration's Chief Counsel for Advocacy. The
Chief Counsel is responsible under the Act for monitoring and re18. The RFA relies on APA definitions regarding which rules are subject to notice and
comment rulemaking. The RFA does not apply to many kinds of administrative actions which
are of importance to small business, such as interpretative rules and policy statements issued
by the Internal Revenue Service. See Verkuil, A Critical Guide to the Regulatory Flexibility
Act, 82 DUKE L.J. 213, 229 (1982) [hereinafter Verkuil].
19. 5 U.S.C. § 553 of the APA requires notice and written comment for most legislative
rules and provides that the requirement "does not apply ... to interpretative rules." 5 U.S.C.
§ 553(b)(A) (1966).
20. An interpretative rule is "any rule an agency issues without exercising delegated
legislative power to make law through rules." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, §
7:8 (1958) [hereinafter DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE].
21. The most common current distinction between legislative and interpretative rules is
not relevant to the discussion of rulemaking for RFA purposes. According to Kenneth Davis,
the difference between legislative and interpretative rulemaking is the delegation of rulemaking authority given the administrative agency and the weight courts must afford the agency
decisions on review. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, supra note 20 §§ 7:8-7:13. For
example, an agency that frequently relies on the interpretative rule distinction as a way to
avoid compliance with the RFA is the Internal Revenue Service. The rules that it labels as
interpretative are not ones where there is any question of agency authority or review power of
the courts.
22. 5 U.S.C. § 605(b).
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porting on agency compliance with the RFA.
The validity of an agency's conclusion that there is no impact is
crucial. If an agency certifies a rule, it does not need to perform
further analysis under the Act unless information obtained by the
agency after its initial proposal dictates the need for further review.23 In a certification, an agency may not claim merely that the
rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial
number of small entities. Rather, an agency must explain its decision
to certify, and discuss why no small entities are significantly affected
or why the number of small entities affected is not substantial.2 4 The
rationales offered for certification should enable small entities and
other members of the public to determine the regulatory objectives
of the agency and to better assess the accuracy of the conclusions
that are the basis of the certification.
A finding that the rule has only a beneficial impact on small
entities does not relieve the agency from performing a regulatory
flexibility analysis. The legislative history of the RFA indicates that
the "significant economic impact" language is neutral with respect to
whether such impact is beneficial or adverse. The statute is designed
not only to avoid harm to small businesses but also to promote their
growth and well being.25 Thus, any doubt as to whether an impact
analysis is required must be resolved in favor of performing such an
analysis. 6
2. Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis.-If an agency expects that a proposed rule will have a significant economic impact on
a substantial number of small entities, an initial regulatory flexibility
analysis (IRFA) describing that impact must be prepared and published in the Federal Register." If the analysis is lengthy, the
agency may publish a summary and make the full text of the analysis available for public examination.
Each IRFA is required to include: (a) a description of the reasons action by the agency is being considered; (b) a succinct statement of the objective of and, legal basis for, the proposed rule; (c) a
description of and, when feasible, an estimate of the number of small
23. In 1987, the Office of Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, reviewed 1043
proposed rules which were certified, compared to 112 proposed rules for which an Initial Regulatory Flexibility Analysis had been performed. See Regulatory Reform Initiatives, supra note
7, at 319.
24. Id.
25. See 126 CONG. REC. H 8468 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1980) (statement of Rep. Ireland).
26. Id. at 8572.
27. 5 U.S.C. § 603.
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entities to which the proposed rule will apply; (d) a description of
the reporting, recordkeeping and other compliance requirements of
the proposed rule, including an estimate of the classes of small entities which will be subject to the requirement and the type of professional skills necessary for preparation of the report or records; and
(e) an identification, to the extent practicable, of all relevant federal
rules which may duplicate, overlap, or conflict with the proposed
rule.28
The RFA also requires that each IRFA describe and analyze
any significant alternatives to the proposed rule which accomplish
the stated objectives of applicable statutes and which minimize any
significant economic impact of the proposed rule on small entities. 9
These significant alternatives may include: establishing differing
compliance or reporting requirements or timetables that take into
account the resources available to small entities; using performance
rather than design standards; or, exempting small entities from coverage of the rule, or any part thereof.
3. Final Regulatory Flexibility Analysis.-When an agency
issues a final rule, the agency must prepare either a final regulatory
flexibility analysis (FRFA) or again certify that the rule will not
have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities.
The FRFA must discuss comments received from the regulated community and other interested parties and must discuss alternatives
considered by the agency while drafting the final rule.3"
Often issues raised in the IRFA are integrated into the FRFA.
The RFA, however, specifically requires agencies to (1) summarize
the issues raised by public comments, (2) summarize the agency's
assessment of those comments, (3) state any changes made in the
proposed rule as a result of the comments, (4) describe each of the
significant alternatives to the rule consistent with the regulatory
objectives, and (5) state why each one of the alternatives was
rejected."1
The FRFA normally is to be made available at the same time
as the final rule, although it may be delayed for up to 180 days in an
emergency. 32 If the agency is required to publish a final analysis
within 180 days of the date of publication of the final rule and fails
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

Id.
Id.
Id. at § 604.
Id.
Id. at § 608.

93

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

SPRING

1989

to do so, the rule is invalid."3 As with proposed rules, however, an
agency may certify that a rule does not have a substantial impact on
a significant number of small entities and avoid the final analysis
requirement.
D. How the Act is Working
1. General Implementation.-The Regulatory Flexibility Act
has increased the awareness of federal agencies with regard to the
regulatory problems confronting small entities. By imposing procedural requirements on rulemaking agencies, the RFA has established
a mechanism through which agencies should recognize and minimize
the impact of regulation on small entities. As a result, the RFA improves rulemaking proceedings and produces rules more acutely focused on the particular requirements of the regulated small entities
without delaying the rulemaking process.
To the extent that it is successful, the implementation of the
RFA owes a great deal to the efforts of the Office of Advocacy of the
Small Business Administration, which is responsible for monitoring
and reporting on the Act. In addition, the Small Business Committees of both the House and Senate perform oversight functions which
exert pressure on agencies to address small entity concerns. Congressional oversight has been important to RFA implementation, but the
Office of Advocacy's monitoring and reporting functions are the only
statutory enforcement tools.
The Office of Advocacy monitors the Federal Register, reviewing each published proposed rule to evaluate agency compliance with
the RFA. Advocacy professional staff regularly contact federal agencies to discuss compliance with the RFA in the context of specific
rules and to work with those agencies to devise internal procedures
for dealing with the RFA. 4 In addition, the Office meets with affected groups and trade associations3" to ascertain regulatory im33. Id. at § 608(b).
34. Some agencies have devised written procedures for their staffs on how to comply
with the RFA. See ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR IMPLEMENTING
THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT, (Feb. 9, 1982) (issued by Anne M. Gorsuch, Administrator, EPA); CIVILIAN AGENCY ACQUISITION COUNCIL & DEFENSE ACQUISITION REGULATORY
COUNCIL, OPERATING

PROCEDURES

FOR COMPLYING WITH THE REGULATORY

FLEXIBILITY

ACT,. (Feb. 4, 1987) (issued by Lawrence J. Rizzi, Chairman, Civilian Agency Acquisition
Council and Col. Otto J. Guenther, Director, Defense Acquisition Council) [hereinafter OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR COMPLYING WITH THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT].

35. In some instances, the regulatory issue may be so narrow that formalized trade associations may not exist to put forth the small business point of view. For example, in 1984,
the U.S. Customs Service issued a proposed regulation to provide procedures to approve commercial gaugers and laboratories. The gaugers are overall a very small industry, not more than

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT

pacts and to assist interested parties in presenting information to the
agencies during rulemaking deliberations.3 6 Furthermore, the Small
Business Data Base (SBDB) can help both agencies and the private
sector to assess regulatory impacts.3 7
The Office of Advocacy has formally commented on more than
350 agency rules over the past seven years. These comment letters
often include discussions of the content of the regulatory flexibility
analyses and of the methodologies used in conducting the underlying

studies.38 Advocacy, in conjunction with and in addition to small
a few hundred, and are only active in specific parts of the country. This group has no organized trade association. The proposed rule was certified by the Customs Service as having no
significant impact even though it would have seriously affected numerous small entities. The
vast majority of public gaugers (those measuring quantities of imported oil) are very small and
employ approximately 5-12 workers on average. The Office of Advocacy became involved with
the rulemaking because of an individual complaint.
36. An agency relying on input from the private sector in its rulemaking activities is the
Environmental Protection Agency. In working with EPA, industry coalitions have formed to
acquire information, to provoke creative thought, and to formulate and support more costeffective regulatory alternatives to EPA's proposals. This has increased industry input and its
effectiveness. These efforts have resulted in many regulatory revisions such as small business
exemptions from water pollution rules, reduced expenditures for the installation of underground storage tanks and community right-to-know rules, as well as the withdrawal of illconceived EPA proposals such as the Alaska logger proposal and the used oil proposal. Small
business trade associations, in conjunction with the Office of Advocacy, have utilized outside
expert consultants to provide EPA with the technical and legal findings to support their comments. On numerous occasions, EPA has adopted the analytic methodology and the regulatory
alternatives developed by these contractors. See, e.g., 52 Fed. Reg. 42,522 (Nov. 5, 1987)
(EPA Final Rule on Organic Chemicals and Plastics and Synthetic Fibers Category Effluent
Limitations Guidelines, Pretreatment Standards, and New Source Performance Standards).
37. The Office of Economic Research of the Office of Advocacy maintains a data base
which is comprised of financial, employment, and other small business data not generally available from the federal statistical system or other information services. This data is kept in a
form that allows disaggregation by size of firm or specific industries. Since 1979, the Office of
Advocacy has leased individual business microdata files from the Dun and Bradstreet Corporation, which serve as the basis of the Small Business Data Base (SBDB). Data from the SBDB
can be analyzed dynamically: by time and by firm employment size classes. The SBDB has
been used to analyze the effects of industrial regulation and restructuring at the local level by
identifying the number of firms in different size classes that may be affected by a given regulation. Because the SBDB is a microdata base, it can be used to draw lists of firms for sampling
purposes. Office of Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, Handbook on Small Business Data 1988 (1988).
38. The Office of Advocacy contracts with private research firms to independently examine agency research methodologies and to analyze agency proposed regulatory alternatives.
Many times these contractor reports add new dimension to agency efforts or raise issues not
previously considered by them. For example, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) issued proposals to implement Title Ill of the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
(SARA). Title II establishes requirements for federal, state and local governments and industry regarding emergency planning and community right-to-know reporting on hazardous chemicals. The major provisions affecting small businesses and small governmental entities were the
community right-to-know reporting requirements (Sections 311, 312) and the toxic chemical
release reporting - emission inventory requirements (Section 313). Although EPA certified
the community right-to-know rule as having no significant impact, they did perform some
analysis of alternatives. A private contractor hired by the Office of Advocacy prepared reports
on raising the final year threshold for reporting for all manufacturers to 2000 pounds rather
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businesses and trade associations, also provides additional information that agencies should analyze before issuing final regulations. 9
The Office of Advocacy has no specific enforcement authority
over agencies subject to the RFA. Although the RFA nominally contains enforcement powers, in reality the success or failure of the Act
and the principles it promotes lies with the regulating agencies. Section 611 provides very limited judicial review" and Section 612 authorizes the Chief Counsel to intervene in judicial proceedings
as
amicus curiae to challenge the reasonableness of a rule.41
than the zero pound threshold originally proposed by EPA. See Comments filed by Hon. Frank
S. Swain, Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration, to Hon. Lee M.
Thomas, Administrator, U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Hazardous Chemical Reporting: Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Programs, Docket 300PQ-IF,
Superfund Docket, regarding Emergency and Hazardous Chemical Inventory Forms and
Community Right-to-Know Reporting Requirements) (Aug. 7, 1987). This would eliminate
automatic reports on chemicals that are of little environmental concern while preserving communities' abilities to obtain necessary information for other chemicals. This change in threshold is of great importance to small manufacturers and, in large part, resulted from the economic analysis provided by the regulated community and its representatives. 52 Fed. Reg.
38344 (Oct. 15, 1987).
39. Section 1207 of the 1987 Department of Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No.
99-661 §§ 100-1412 (Nov. 14, 1986) 100 Stat. § 3816-4012, now codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2301
(note), established a goal of awarding five percent of all Department of Defense (DOD) procurement dollars in Fiscal Years 1987-89 to small firms owned and controlled by socially and
economically disadvantaged individuals, historically black colleges and universities, or other
minority institutions. These regulations will have a substantial impact on many small businesses involved in DOD procurements. Achievement of the five percent goal of Section 1207
will require a doubling of the' present small disadvantaged business (SDB) share of DOD
prime contract dollars, and an increase of approximately $3 billion annually in awards to SDB
firms. It is apparent that this may well shift a good deal of procurement from small business
generally to SDB concerns. The Office of Advocacy provided data for Fiscal Year 1987 procurement which suggest that a displacement is already occurring. Overall DOD awards to
business firms dropped by $1.2 billion from the Fiscal Year 1986 level. While the total small
business share remained steady at 19.7 percent, small businesses overall received $300 million
less in prime contract awards. At the same time, the SDB share grew by $100 million, an
increase from 2.3 percent to 2.5 percent of total awards. Thus, while SDB firms received $200
million more in prime contract awards in Fiscal Year 1987, non-SDB small business firms
received $500 million less. This information presented to the Department of Defense was a
starting point for their further analysis of the proposal and resulted in changes to alleviate this
negative impact on small business. THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT TRANSMITTED TO THE CONGRESS 1989 152-54 (1989) [hereinafter THE PRESIDENT'S
REPORT]

40. A discussion of judicial review is found at notes 69-99 and accompanying text.
41. The amicus power has not been used to enforce the RFA for two reasons. The Department of Justice has taken the position that Congress does not have constitutional authority
to confer upon the Chief Counsel for Advocacy the unabridged right to intervene as amicus
curiae without the agreement of the Attorney General. In its memorandum of May 17, 1983,
the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) of the Department of Justice asserts that the Chief Counsel's authority to participate as amicus curiae in any action brought in a court of the United
States to review a rule is limited to proceedings which challenge the validity of rules promulgated by independent agencies, and then only if the Attorney General or any Executive Branch
officer has not already taken a position on behalf of the United States that is inconsistent with
that which the Chief Counsel seeks to present. The OLC opinion is based on separation of
power principles in that the President must be able to control his subordinates to fulfill his
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2. Congressional Oversight.-While the prospect of judicial
review might put greater pressure on agencies to comply with the

RFA, Congressional oversight also can be a very effective means of
ensuring compliance. Oversight hearings on the RFA provide small
entities and the regulated public with a forum in which to highlight
both problem areas as well as the work of those agencies responding
to the needs of small entities.

2

Agency witnesses appearing before

Congressional committees must explain or justify their reticence or
noncompliance regarding a particular issue. In addition, hearings
provide Congress with an opportunity to examine whether the Act is

working and whether modifications are needed.
Congressional oversight has also resulted in positive, direct legislative actions helpful to small businesses. For example, in hearings
held in 1982,'" one issue discussed at length was the need to apply
the RFA to procurement rules issued by the Department of Defense. 44 At that time, procurement regulation decisions were rarely

made with public input because such decisions were not subject to
the notice and comment rulemaking procedures of the APA. 45 Beconstitutional charge. See Office of Legal Counsel, Memorandum for the Assistant Attorney
General regarding Amicus Curiae Role of Small Business Administration's Chief Counselfor
Advocacy under the Regulatory Flexibility Act, (May 17, 1983). The SBA had maintained
that the limited right of amicus conferred by the statute does not disrupt executive authority,
and that no loss of executive authority could be construed as long as the President retains
direct removal authority over the SBA Chief Counsel for Advocacy.
As a practical matter, because of the severe statutory limitations of judicial review, very
few cases involving the RFA have even litigated. The opportunities to raise the RFA issues
have been rare.
42. Oversight of the Regulatory Flexibility Act (Part 1): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Export Opportunities and Special Small Business Problems of the House Comm.
on Small Business, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. (1981); Oversight of the Regulatory Flexibility Act
(Part 2): Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Export Opportunitiesand Special Small Business
Problems of the House Comm. on Small Business, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982) [hereinafter
RFA Oversight Hearings]; Regulatory Flexibility Act: Joint Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Regulatory Reform of the Senate Judiciary Comm. and the Subcomm. on Government
Regulation and Paperwork of the Senate Comm. on Small Business, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1982) (hereinafter Joint RFA Hearings]; Implementation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Export Opportunities and Special Small Business
Problems of the House Comm. on Small Business, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) [hereinafter
RFA Implementation Hearings].
43. Joint RFA Hearings, supra note 42.
44. Federal procurement regulation is very important to small business. The federal government spent close to $200 billion for the acquisition of goods and services in Fiscal Year
1987. Of this amount, small businesses received $35.4 billion, or close to 18 percent of the
total direct contract dollars awarded. See THE PRESIDENT's REPORT, supra note 39, at 144.
45. Section 553 of Title 5 (the APA) exempts military and foreign affairs functions of
the United States and exempts matters related to agency management, personnel, public property, loans, grants, benefits or contracts. The Department of Defense does not perform a regulatory function, and the regulations of the Department of Defense come within these exemptions. There is no other law that requires the Department of Defense to publish a notice of
proposed rulemaking. Thus, by its terms, the Regulatory Flexibility Act does not apply. See
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cause of this exemption and the absence of any other law 6 explicitly
requiring such regulations to be published for comment, defense procurement rules largely escaped both public comment and RFA analysis. The small business community strongly supported legislation to
close this gap in the RFA coverage.4
In 1984, Congress enacted the Small Business and Federal Procurement Competition Enhancement Act. This Act requires that significant proposed procurement policies, regulations, procedures and
forms be published for public comment prior to taking effect. This
requirement constitutes the "other law" which triggers applicability
of the RFA to such procurement actions."8 Thus, for the first time,
small business government contractors, trade associations, and other
members of the affected public were entitled to examine and comment on proposed significant procurement regulations.
If a proposed procurement rule is "significant,"' 9 it must be
published, and the agency must further determine whether to prepare an initial regulatory flexibility analysis for the rules pursuant to
the RFA, or whether to certify that the rule will not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.5"
Another issue which has been the subject of Congressional scrutiny is the application of the RFA to marketing orders issued by the
Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) of the U.S. Department of
Agriculture (USDA). AMS had refused to acknowledge that the
RFA applied to such orders. 51 During an RFA oversight hearing
Letter from Dennis H. Trosch, Assistant General Counsel for Logistics, Department of Defense to Marshall Parker, Acting Chief Counsel for Advocacy (June 30, 1981).
46. The RFA applies to all rules for which notice and comment is required under § 553
of the APA or any other law. 5 U.S.C. § 601(2).
47. See S. 2489, The Small Business Competition Enhancement Act of 1984; and S.
2434, A Bill to Amend Section 15 of the Small Business Act by Requiring the Assignment of
Breakout Procurement Center Representatives: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Small
Business, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984). The bill before the Committee, the Small Business
Competition Enhancement Act of 1984, focused on three aspects of procurement reform: first,
the elimination or reduction of obstacles to participation by small business in the procurement
process, which includes coverage of procurement rules within the ambit of the RFA; second,
the planning to increase competitive procurement of spare parts and other items for future
major systems before the initial production phase and devising a system for validating proprietary data claims; and finally, the increased use of Breakout Procurement Center Representatives (BOPCRs) at major procurement centers.
48. The APA specifically exempts procurement policies, regulations, procedures and
forms. Coverage by the RFA is determined by Pub. L. No. 98-577, codified at 41 U.S.C. § 251
note (1984).
49. "Significant" is defined as any rule which has an effect on contractors or offerors or
is beyond the internal operating procedures of the issuing agency. Pub. L. No. 98-577, as
codified at 41 U.S.C. § 251 note (1984).
50. See OPERATING PROCEDURES FOR COMPLYING WITH THE REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY
ACT, supra note 34.
51. A draft USDA memo from the Office of General Counsel concluded that the RFA
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held in April 1986 before the House Subcommittee on Export Opportunities and Special Small Business Problems of the House Committee on Small Business, the Subcommittee asked the Department
of Agriculture to provide a legal opinion from its General Counsel on
the applicability of the Regulatory Flexibility Act to AMS marketing orders. The General Counsel's office had not issued a formal
opinion prior to the Subcommittee's request. The following day, the
General Counsel issued a memorandum of law which clearly stated
that marketing orders are subject to the provisions of the RFA. 2
Although this opinion does not resolve all problems concerning
AMS' compliance with the RFA, it does resolve the debate on
whether the Act applies.
Another difficult area involving the implementation of the RFA
concerns compliance by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) in its regulation of local telephone companies. 3 In an April
1986 hearing before the same Subcommittee of the House Committee on Small Business, small telephone companies criticized the FCC
for failing to apply the RFA. In several rulemaking proceedings, the
FCC had contended that the RFA did not apply because small telephone companies have monopolies in their local service areas and are
therefore "dominant" and not small businesses as defined in the
Small Business Act.64 The Chairman of the FCC testified before the
was not applicable to marketing orders. Memorandum to the Secretary of Agriculture from
Daniel Oliver, General Counsel, on the "Applicability of the Regulatory Flexibility Act to
Marketing Orders issued under the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937." See also
RFA Implementation Hearings, supra note 42, at 86-97 (testimony of Carl A. Pescosolido, Jr.,
Co-owner, Sequoia Orange Co., Inc., Exeter, Cal.).
52. In his memorandum to the Secretary of Agriculture, Daniel Oliver stated:
It is my opinion that marketing agreements and orders are "rules" under
the RFA, and that the procedural steps mandated by RFA must be followed
with respect to every proposed agreement, order, or amendment thereto, unless
the agency can certify and substantiate that the rule would not have a significant
economic impact on a substantial number of small entities.
See Memorandum to the Secretary of Agriculture, supra note 51.
53. The FCC attempts to define those they regulate as other than small business and
concludes that indirect impacts on small business do not require analysis. See RFA Implementation Hearings,supra note 42, at 168-72 (testimony of Doris S. Freedman, Director, Regulatory Affairs, Office of the Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration).
See also RFA Implementation Hearings, supra note 42, at 3-32 (testimony of Frank S. Swain,
Chief Counsel for Advocacy, U.S. Small Business Administration).
54. The RFA permits agencies to define "small entities" by using the Small Business
Act definition, or their own definitions after consulting with the Office of Advocacy. The Small
Business Act defines a small business concern as one that is independently owned and operated, and one which is not dominant in its field. 15 U.S.C. § 632(a)(1) (1988). Another criterion suggested is evaluation based on the size standards regarding sales and/or employment
established by Small Business Administration rule. Id. The FCC disagrees with this conclusion. See RFA Implementation Hearings, supra note 42, at 254-55 (testimony of Mark S.
Fowler, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission).
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Subcommittee on agency implementation of the RFA.5 5
In a December 1986 letter to the Subcommittee Chairman,
however, in response to questions raised during the April hearing

and follow-up meeting with Subcommittee members and staff, the
FCC chairman altered the agency's prior position and stated that the

FCC would comply with the formal analysis requirements of the
RFA.5
The application of the RFA to Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
interpretative rules, many of which have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small businesses, also has been the
subject of several Congressional hearings.5 Small businesses affected
by IRS rules testified, and members of the Subcommittee questioned
the Commissioner of the IRS concerning the agency's refusal to consider applying the RFA to its rules." The Congress obliquely ad-

dressed this issue in the Taxpayer Bill of Rights in 1988. 51

Although the Office of Advocacy's participation in agency
rulemakings and Congressional oversight has influenced some agencies to follow RFA procedures, the lack of the most effective compliance tool, judicial review, is beyond the jurisdiction of either the Office of Advocacy or an oversight committee to correct. The language

of the RFA itself is the culprit. The RFA does not provide for any
meaningful judicial review of agency determinations made pursuant
to the Regulatory Flexibility Act. The Act states: "[w]hen an action

for judicial review of a rule is instituted, any regulatory flexibility
55. Testimony of Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission. Id.
56. Letter from Mark S. Fowler, Chairman, Federal Communications Commission, to
Ike Skelton, Chairman, Subcommittee on Export Opportunities and Special Small Business
Problems, Committee on Small Business, U.S. House of Representatives, Dec. 22, 1986.
57. Joint RFA Hearings, supra note 42. See also RFA Implementation Hearings. supra
note 42.
58. See RFA Oversight Hearings, supra note 42, at 358-87 (testimony of Roscoe L.
Egger, Commissioner, Internal Revenue Service).
59. During consideration of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 100-647, the issue
of the applicability of the Regulatory Flexibility Act to IRS rules was debated during the
Senate Finance Committee markup of the bill. Senator Pryor introduced amendments that
would have severely limited the IRS' ability to escape RFA analyses by claiming that their
rules were interpretative. During Finance Committee deliberation, Senator Pryor's amendments were rejected and instead a provision requiring the IRS to submit their proposed rules
to the Small Business Administrator for comment before adoption was added. In practice, this
means only that a copy of the Federal Register notice is sent to the SBA at the same time
public comment is solicited; there is no improvement over the current requirements of the
RFA. There is no requirement in the Taxpayer Bill of Rights which requires that the IRS take
into account the comments of the Small Business Administration or issue regulations in any
different manner. However, all IRS rules, including interpretative rules, are subject to this
provision of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights. The new language does not expand coverage of the
RFA but does confirm the Congress' intent to insure that the IRS address small business
issues in its rulemakings.
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analysis of such rule shall constitute part of the whole record of
agency action in connection with the review." 0 The RFA also provides that the Chief Counsel for Advocacy is authorized to appear as
amicus curiae in any action brought in a court of the United States
to review a rule.6"
III.

Judicial Review

The issue of judicial review was controversial during congressional debate on the statute. The Act, as finally passed, tried to
strike a balance between minimizing opportunities for stalling the
regulatory process6" while providing for the existence of judicial review to ensure agency compliance. The compromise position adopted
by Congress in the RFA, nevertheless, is not a successful formula for
guaranteeing implementation of the principles underlying the Act.
A.

History of Enactment

The Regulatory Flexibility Act was signed by President Carter
on September 19, 1980,63 and became effective January 1, 1981. The
legislative history of the Act is unusual in that there is no formal
House or Senate report explaining the language of the bill. It is
therefore important to examine previous legislative proposals to understand the background and legislative climate which underlie the
passage of the Act.
In 1979, the Senate was considering a bill to address federal
regulation of small businesses but later adopted a substitute version
in the form of an unprinted amendment.64 The House adopted this
substitute version without having referred the bill to any
Committee. 6
The substitute version of S. 299 was very similar to H.R. 4660
60.

61.

5 U.S.C. § 611(b).

5 U.S.C. § 612(b).

See 126 CONG. REC. 21,457.
[T]he bill strikes a balance between two central aims with regard to the role
of the courts. The first is to insure that an agency's compliance with the objectives of this bill be subject to meaningful, yet responsibly defined, judicial oversight. A flat prohibition of any such oversight might give the erroneous impression that regulatory flexibility provisions may be ignored with impunity . ...
On the other hand, the bill avoids the substantial disruption of agency rulemaking inherent in allowing separate judicial review of the regulatory flexibility
analysis itself.

62.

Id.
63. Pub. L. No. 96-354, 5 U.S.C. §§
64. U.P. No. 1502, 126 CONG. REc.
65. This substitute version of the bill
endar" on Sept. 9, 1980. 126 CONG. Rac.

601-12 (1981).
21,451 (1980).
was adopted by the House on its "Suspension Cal24,823 (1980).
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which was pending at the time in the House Small Business Committee. S. 299, as adopted, however, did not amend the Small Business Act but rather was a procedural statute codified in the same
title as the APA.66 Once the bill became a procedural rule affecting
all agencies, the House Judiciary Committee obtained jurisdiction
over the legislation.67
With the absence of a formal legislative history, those seeking
to discern the intent of the legislators must turn to the Description
of Major Issues and Section-by-Section Analysis of the Substitute
for S.299 and the "Discussion of Issues," both of which were submitted to the Congressional Record by sponsors of the legislation
during its consideration. These were intended to substitute for the
more conventional Senate and House reports that usually accompany
legislation.6 8
66. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1976).
67. See Letter from Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Chrm., House Committee on the Judiciary to Hon. Neal Smith, Chrm., House Committee on Small Business (July 12, 1979). The
basis of Chairman Rodino's request was that all agencies would be governed by the procedures
under the APA and, therefore, under the purview of the Judiciary Committee.
68. Passages in the Congressional Record show that this is the case. Senator Culver
stated the following:
The subcommittee also has had the continued and constructive cooperation
of the administration, organized labor, public interest groups, as well as the valuable assistance of Members of the House of Representatives who share our goal
for the enactment of regulatory flexibility into law this year.
Since the Judiciary Committee reported S. 299 in May, weeks of negotiation with all of these groups have culminated in the legislation which we adopt
today. In order to explain the substitute which is being offered for S. 299, we
have prepared a revised description of this legislation, the major issues which it
addresses, and a section-by-section analysis of its provisions.
126 CONG. REC. 21,452 (1980). The House of Representatives' "Discussion of Issues" begins
as follows:
When the Senate passed S. 299 on August 6, a "Description of Major Issues and a Section-by-Section Analysis" was provided to explain certain substitute language adopted for that bill. (See 126 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD 21,45221461.) Members of the House of of Representatives took an active role in helping the various parties in interest achieve the understandings which were necessary to bring the measure before the Senate, just as members of the Senate have
provided much help in bringing the measure before the House of Representatives
today. Thus the Senate document entered into the Record on August 6 already
reflects many of the concerns of House members who have been involved in the
development of regulatory flexibility legislation. Indeed, much of S. 299 is derived from provisions of H.R. 4660. Rather than commenting again on each of
the various sections of S. 299, as passed by the Senate, this Discussion of Issues
will supplement the Senate document by noting some general themes and objectives of the legislation, occasionally amplifying some of the points made during
Senate consideration, and drawing upon, where appropriate, House Report 96519 on H.R. 4660 (which should be incorporated by reference into the legislative
history of the pending bill.) That House Report more fully conveys the views on
regulatory flexibility legislation of the principal authors and sponsors in the
House of Representatives. Agreement on the matters discussed in this Discussion
of Issues has helped provide the broad political consensus necessary to bring S.
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B. Judicial Review Provisions
Section 611 of the Act, entitled Judicial Review, states that:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (b), any determination by an agency concerning the applicability of any of
the provisions of this chapter to any action of the agency shall
not be subject to judicial review.
This attempts to clarify the intended role of a court in the examination of rules and regulatory flexibility analyses. Agency determinations concerning whether the provisions of the Act apply to any action by the agency shall not be subject to judicial review.6 9 The
Senate Discussion noted that "[t]o do otherwise would be counter to
the key principle underlying the Administrative Procedure Act," 70
that only the final rule is subject to review using a reasonableness
standard.7 1
Neither the regulatory flexibility analyses themselves, required
under the Act, 72 nor agency compliance or noncompliance with the
provisions of this section are to be subject to judicial review." Section 611 (b) provides:
Any regulatory flexibility analysis prepared under sections
603 and 604 of this title and the compliance or noncompliance
of the agency with the provisions of this chapter shall not be
subject to judicial review. When an action for judicial review of
299 before the House of Representatives in lieu of H.R. 4660.
126 CONG. REC. 24,588 (1980).
69. This includes the decision by the head of an agency to certify that a rule will not
have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities. See Description
of Major Issues, supra note 68, at 21,457.
70. Id.
71. This review is an inquiry into whether a rule is arbitrary or capricious. See generally
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE

LAW TREATISE,

supra note 20, at Chapter 29.

72.
73.

See notes 27-33 and accompanying text.
The Senate Discussion states that:
Section 611(a) provides that there is no judicial review of any determination by an agency regarding the applicability of any provision of this subchapter
except as provided in Section 611 (b). This means, for example, that the decision
by an agency with respect to what proposed rules would have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of small entities pursuant to Section
605(b) shall not be subject to judicial review. Thus, the decision regarding when
the agency shall conduct a regulatory flexibility analysis remains in the sole discretion of the agency. Also not subject to judicial review are agency determinations regarding the agenda (section 602), the procedures for gathering comments
(section 609), the periodic review of rules (section 610) and any other administrative determinations under this act.

Description of Major Issues, supra note 68, at 21,460-61.
There was no discussion concerning judicial review in the House of Representatives' Discussion of Issues.
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a rule is instituted, any regulatory flexibility analysis for such
rule shall constitute part of the whole record of agency action in

connection with the review.
Thus, the content of the regulatory flexibility analysis is to be available for consideration by a court to the extent relevant to the issue
before the court, when determining the validity of the rule which is
the subject of an analysis. When a challenge to a rule is initiated,
the regulatory flexibility analysis becomes part of the entire
rulemaking record of agency action in connection with the review."
Thus, the drafters of the legislation anticipated that there would
be review of a regulatory flexibility analysis only in the context of
review of the ultimate reasonableness of a rule. During the House
debate, a member presented the question concerning what occurs if
an agency fails to do an analysis, or if the analysis is "inadequate,
sloppy or incomplete. What if the agency ignores significant information provided by an affected individual; or, more important, what
happens if the agency ignores its own findings and makes a conclu-

sion that is not in keeping with its own facts?"

5

A response stated

that the reviewing court should strike down the regulation."6
74. This is clear also from various discussions during debate on the legislation. For example, Congressman Harris stated that: "There will be no separate judicial review of the regulatory analysis, though it will be part of the record on review of the rule itself." 126 CONG.
REc. 24,578 (1980). This was reiterated by Congressman Moorhead. 126 CONG. REC. 24,582.
According to Congressman Butler:
Although the provision for judicial review in S.299 is less encompassing
than the review applicable in H.R. 4660, this provision nevertheless insures that
Government agencies will take seriously their obligation to comply with this new
mandate. Current implementation of the concept of regulatory flexibility varies
greatly among the agencies. The judicial review provision is designed to eliminate undesirable interlocutory or purely procedural challenges to the rulemaking
proceedings, but leave unimpaired the present right under the Administrative
Procedure Act of review of the final rule. While the compliance of an agency
with respect to the particular provisions of this legislation are not subject to
independent review, such matters may be relevant to a determination of the reasonableness of the final rule.
Thus, unlike the situation regarding environmental impact statements, the
failure to perform a regulatory analysis would be not grounds for injunctive relief in advance of the issuance of the final rule. However, the failure to perform
an analysis of a reasonable alternative consistent with the regulatory goal may
be adequate grounds for a determination that the final rule is unreasonable. Similarly, an agency's unreasonable determination not to perform a regulatory flexibility analysis may provide a basis for invalidation of the final rule, but would
not be grounds for interlocutory relief.
Id. at 24,592-93.
75. This was asked by Congressman Broomfield. Id. at 24,583.
76. Congressman McDade responded to Congressman Broomfield:
Let me say unequivocally, as a member of the committee that wrote this
bill, that in that instance, upon review of the final regulation, it is the intent of
our committee that the court should strike down the regulation.
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C. Court Consideration
The seemingly inherent contradiction of Section 611(a) and
611 (b) has confused those reviewing agency adherence to the law. In
the first article written on the RFA seven years ago, the author predicted that placing much agency action beyond judicial scrutiny
would jeopardize the effectiveness of the RFA:
In effect, Congress subordinated the value of compliance induced by judicial oversight to the values of administrative efficiency and uninterrupted decisionmaking. Even though non-reviewability of the certification process may frustrate the RFA's
purpose, Congress chose to take this risk rather than embroil the
process in the quagmire of litigation. (citations omitted)"
Although application of the RFA has not been considered by many
courts, the few decisions issued have reflected judicial frustration
with Congress' attempt to have two views on reviewability.
Section 611 (b) of the Act provides both that agency compliance
not be subject to judicial review and that regulatory flexibility analyses shall be considered a part of the record for the purpose of such
review. These provisions became the subject of judicial scrutiny in
Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force v. EPA.7 8 In the underlying rulemaking, EPA performed a regulatory flexibility analysis
at the request of the SBA Chief Counsel, evaluating the reasonableness of alternative requirements on the lead content of gasoline produced by small refiners.7 9 The Office of Advocacy worked with EPA
to provide a considerable record on the costs and health benefits of
the EPA proposal and alternative rules regulating lead.
EPA concluded, in its final regulatory flexibility analysis, that
differential treatment of small refiners was not warranted, considering the balance of costs and health benefits. In the court case, the
Small Refiner Lead Phase-Down Task Force contended that the rule
was invalid on the grounds that the regulatory flexibility analysis
failed to discuss significant alternatives to a uniform standard, or,
alternatively, failed to adequately explain why alternatives submitted
by the regulated community were rejected. EPA argued that Congress had barred review of agency compliance with the RFA. The
id.
77. Verkuil, supra note 18, at 260.
78. 705 F.2d 506 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
79. Petitions filed in this case sought review of a regulation promulgated by the Environmental Protection Agency setting lead-content limits for leaded gasoline produced by small
refiners.
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circuit court ruled that the adequacy of EPA's regulatory flexibility
analysis should be evaluated as part of the review to determine
whether the rule was reasonable. "A reviewing court . . . may...
strike down a rule because of a defect in the flexibility analysis."80
Nevertheless, the court found the analysis to be adequate and upheld
the final rule. Thus, the D.C. Circuit Court reconciled the two provisions by indicating that the regulatory flexibility analysis should be
reviewed as part of the rulemaking record in order to determine
whether a rule is arbitrary and capricious insofar as the rule is applied to small businesses.
The D.C. Circuit revisited the reviewability of regulatory flexibility analyses in Thompson v. Clark.8 1 In Thompson, an independent oil and gas developer challenged an Interior Department rule
increasing the filing and rental fees for certain noncompetitive oil
and gas leases. The Department, pursuant to the requirements of the
RFA, certified that the rule would not have a significant economic
impact on a substantial number of small entities. The developer
claimed that the Interior Department misapplied section 605(b) of
the RFA.82
The D.C. Circuit rejected the developer's contentions. The court
concluded that the certification by the Interior Department was a
determination by an agency of the applicability of the RFA. The
court then held that the plain language of section 611 prohibits a
court from reviewing such agency determinations. The court employed an identical rationale in declining to review the agency's failure to publish a succinct statement explaining the certification.
The court then reaffirmed the holding of Small Refiner Lead
Phase-Down Task Force. The court noted that a reviewing court
"will consider the contents of the preliminary or final regulatory flexibility analysis, along with the rest of the record, in assessing not the
agency's compliance with the RFA, but the validity of the rule under
other provisions of law."' Specifically, the court noted the possibility
that a defective regulatory analysis could lead an agency to underestimate the harm to small businesses and this harm could be sufficient
enough to outweigh the benefits of the rule. Under such a scenario,
the rule would be set aside:
80. 705 F.2d at 539.
81. 741 F.2d 401 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
82. The criteria for certifying that a rule will not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities also are contained in Section 605(b).
83. 741 F.2d at 405.
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not because the regulatory flexibility analysis was defective, but
because the mistaken premise reflected in the . . . analysis de-

prives the rule of its required rational support, and thus causes it
to violate - not any special obligation of the Regulatory Flexibility Act - but the general legal requirement of reasoned,
nonarbitrary decisionmaking .... 8"
To buttress this conclusion, the court examined the legislative history
of the RFA and found no evidence that Congress intended the courts
to review agency compliance with the RFA outside a court's overall
review of the rulemaking record.
A Texas district court considered the decisions of the D.C. Circuit in Texarkana Livestock Commission v. United States Department of Agriculture.8 6 Texas cattle auction operators on the Texas/
Arkansas border sought an exemption from a rule promulgated by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) which required sellers
of cattle raised in Arkansas but sold at the Texarkana market to
Arkansas buyers to conduct two tests for brucellosis. The USDA
certified that this double testing requirement would not have a significant impact on a substantial number of small entities. In its review of the agency's refusal to grant an exemption to the auction
operators based on their unique circumstances, the court critically
examined the certification by the USDA.
The court stated that "in light of the now-admitted economic
consequences it does seem that such a certification should be supported," and criticized the absence of such support.8 6 The court used
the miscertification, not as a linchpin to overturn the USDA's decision, but as evidence to support its conclusion that the failure to
grant the exemption was arbitrary and capricious and should be set
87
aside under the APA.
In Mid-Tex Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. FERC,88 the D.C. Circuit further restricted the extent of analysis required by the Act. The
court examined a challenge to a rule promulgated by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) which allowed public utilities to include current construction expenses in their rate bases.
FERC maintained that the rule directly affected large public utilities
84. Id. (emphasis in original).
85. 613 F. Supp. 271 (E.D. Texas 1985).
86. Id. at 277.
87. Id. at 278. Although this court holding is supportive of more expanded judicial review, no other court has adopted this opinion. Other courts have followed the D.C. Circuit in
holding that no certification decisions are reviewable.
88. 773 F.2d 327 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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only, and, as a result, would not have a significant impact on small
entities. The agency, therefore, did not perform a regulatory flexibility analysis. The challengers contended that the rule would raise
electric rates and thereby adversely affect numerous small entities.
They argued that the lack of regulatory flexibility analysis demonstrated the arbitrariness of the rule. In support of their contention,
opponents cited statements by Senator Culver (one of the main sponsors of the Act) that both the direct and indirect effects of a rule
must be considered as part of the flexibility analysis.8 9
The court, however, disagreed with the challengers' interpretation of the RFA's legislative history and held that Congressional intent with respect to the analysis of indirect effects was ambiguous.90
The court suggested that the reference to indirect effects applied
only to the indirect effects on the industry directly affected by the
rule, and not to the indirect effects of a rule on society in general. 9
Another court, in Lehigh Valley Farmers v. Block,92 rejected
the ability of a court to review an agency's decision to certify a rule,
even when the record as a whole showed the determination to certify
to be incorrect. A group of dairy producers challenged the Agriculture Department's decision to expand a milk marketing order to
counties not already included in the order. The plaintiffs asserted,
inter alia, that the Secretary's decision failed to comply with the
requirements of the RFA. The Secretary had determined that the
changes in the marketing order would not have a significant impact
on a substantial number of small entities. The plaintiffs contended
that USDA's certification of no substantial small entity impact was
incorrect. The court agreed, but recognized that the threshold issue
was whether the court could review the Secretary's decision to
certify.9"
In its effort to determine the reviewability of the Secretary's decision to certify, the court examined the sparse judicial precedent. It
first analyzed the district court's opinion in Sargent v. Block. 94 The
court rejected the perfunctory analysis in Sargent because the Sargent court did not have to decide the reviewability issue, given its
finding on standing. 95
89. Id. at 342 (citing 126 CONG. REC. 21,558-59 (1980)).
90. Id. at 342-43.
91. Id. at 343.
92. 640 F. Supp. 1497 (E.D. Pa. 1986), affid, 829 F.2d 409 (3d Cir. 1987).
93. Id. at 1518-20.
94. 576 F. Supp. 882 (D.D.C. 1983).
95. 640 F. Supp. at 1518. The court also noted, but did not discuss, the non-reviewability determination of the Court of International Trade in Mast Industries v. Regan, 596 F.

REGULATORY FLEXIBILITY ACT

Although the Lehigh Valley court agreed with the D.C. Circuit's conclusion pertaining to the non-reviewability of regulatory
flexibility certifications, the court did so with reluctance. The court
noted that "Senator Culver appeared to contradict himself." At one
point during his remarks, the Senator stated:
If an agency . ..completely and consciously ignores the
• . .requirement to perform regulatory flexibility analyses, an
injured party would have grounds to argue that this fact is evidence of the unreasonableness of the rule ...."
This statement appears to contradict Senator Culver's statement that
"the decision regarding when the agency shall conduct a regulatory
flexibility analysis remains in the sole discretion of the agency." 97
The Lehigh Valley court nevertheless determined that the latter
statement controlled the outcome.
The court also recognized that "Congress theoretically rendered
Sections 603 and 604 of the RFA nullities based on Sections 605
and 611.""9 The court then suggested, however, that "it is for Congress to correct this anomaly if it so desires.""
IV.

Conclusion

The RFA, as intended by Congress, is an efficient mechanism to
require federal agencies to consider the burdens of regulation on
small entities. The ultimate effectiveness of this mechanism, however, is questionable, given the statutory interpretations in Thompson v. Clark and Lehigh Valley, which prohibit judicial review of
certifications.
The initial decision to certify a rule is the threshold question
that triggers any further analysis by an agency. Without an adequate means to challenge an agency's certification decision, the RFA
has been viewed by some agencies as an unenforceable administrative procedure with which they need not comply. The absence of
meaningful judicial review has created a checkered compliance record, dependent upon each agency's essentially voluntary commitment
to sound rulemaking practices or upon its responsiveness to pressures
for fair regulatory treatment. Small entities, however, should have
more to rely on than these mechanisms; for the Act to work as inSupp. 1567 (C.I.T. 1984).
96. Id. at 1520 n.20 (quoting 126 CONG. REc. S 21,457 daily ed., August 6, 1980).
97. 126 CONG. REc. 21,460-61 (1980).
98. 640 F. Supp. at 1520 n.20.
99. Id.
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tended, a meaningful judicial review provision must be adopted.
The small business community and representatives of small governmental jurisdictions are eager for change to the RFA. 00 As with
most procedural reform, however, the real impediment may be the
federal bureaucracy. The regulatory agencies that implement the
Act and are accountable for failure to fully comply with the Act's
mandates are not supportive of expanding opportunities to effectively
enforce the Act.'' Some support for expanding judicial review exists, however, among members of Congress, 10 2 and reconsideration of
the RFA may well occur in the 101st Congress.

100. See Recommendation 10 of the 1986 White House Conference on Small Business
Recommendations, The White House Conference on Small Business, A Report to the President of the United States (Nov. 1986).
101. See, e.g., Regulatory Reform Initiatives, supra note 7, at 64 (testimony of Richard
D. Morgenstern, Director, Office of Policy Analysis, Environmental Protection Agency).
102. Cong. Andy Ireland has introduced legislation (H.R. 192) in the 101st Congress
designed in part to strengthen judicial review of regulatory flexibility analyses and to make
interpretative rules under the IRS Code subject to the requirements of the Act. This legislation has been referred to the House Small Business and Judiciary Committees. See also note
59, supra.

